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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
R I C H A R D F . BASSETT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Case No. 
vs. 
W A L T E R BAKER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E N A T U R E 
OF T H E CASE 
The plaintiff and the defendant were involved in 
the business of raising cattle for profit. This action was 
commenced by the plaintiff for an accounting, and to 
terminate the relationship. The plaintiff claims that the 
parties had entered into a partnership and that the ac-
counting should allocate profits and losses on the basis 
of that partnership agreement. The defendant counter-
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claimed that the parties had never entered into any 
agreement, and that the plaintiff should pay the de-
fendant under quantum meruit the reasonable value of 
the services and goods supplied by the plaintiff to the 
defendant in caring for the cattle. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
By pre-trial order entered 1st April, 1974, the 
Honorable J . Robert Bullock appropriately bifurcated 
the case with the first trial to determine the relationship 
which existed between the parties, and the second trial 
to determine damages or an accounting growing out of 
that relationship. 
On June 3, 1974 the case was tried to the court 
sitting without a jury. The court held that a joint ven-
ture existed between the parties and that a further ac-
counting should be had on the basis of the joint venture. 
The defendant moved that the lower court amend 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law, which mo-
tion was denied by the court on July 10, 1974. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant seeks reversal of the lower court's 
order denying the defendant's motion to amend, and an 
order to the lower court to modify and amend its find-
2 
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ings to conform as a matter of law to the points of this 
brief. 
The only question before this Court is whether or 
not a joint venture existed between the parties. If this 
Court should adjudge that no joint venture existed, the 
further question of what, if any, relationship did exist 
between the parties should be decided at the trial court 
level. 
S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, an airline pilot by profession, decided 
to make his permanent home in Wasatch County, Utah 
(Tr. 18). The plaintiff owned some land and was 
anxious to start an adventure in farming. However, 
since the plaintiff was out of town flying a great deal 
of the time, and since the plaintiff had no knowledge of 
farming, the plaintiff turned to local people to aid his 
adventure (Tr. 14). 
The defendant is a resident of Charleston, Utah, 
and is by profession a heavy equipment mechanic and 
farmer (Tr. 43). 
The plaintiff and the defendant first met on the 
premises of a local farm equipment dealer where the 
defendant was employed, and from which the plaintiff 
had purchased some farm equipment (Tr. 43). A series 
of several casual conversations ensued during which the 
3 
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parties explored their mutual interest in raising cattle 
(Tr. 24, 26-27, 44-48). 
On or about September 9, 1972, the plaintiff pur-
chased 26 cattle and delivered the said cattle to the de-
fendant (Tr. 48). There was an uncontroverted under-
standing that the plaintiff would pay for the cattle and 
do bookkeeping services while the defendant did the 
actual work of managing and caring for the cattle, and 
that the parties would split the profits (Tr. 15, 46, 50). 
Nothing was said about losses (Tr. 16). The court's 
findings of fact characterize this September 9, 1972 
understanding as a "joint venture." 
The original plan was that the above mentioned 26 
cattle were to be merely a first installment, and that the 
plaintiff would purchase and deliver an additional 74 
cows for the defendant's care and management (Tr. 20, 
46, 47). However, the plaintiff quickly became disen-
chanted with the defendant and the plaintiff failed to 
deliver the additional 74 cows to bring the herd up to 
the projected number of 100 (Tr. 21-22, 28). 
The defendant cared for this herd of 26 cows from 
September 9, 1972, until the 19th day of June, 1973. 
During this period many of the cows had calves so that 
by the spring of 1973 the defendant was caring for a 
herd of approximately 42 cattle. (The defendant's an-
swers to plaintiff's interrogatories #1) . 
During the period of the defendant's stewardship 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the defendant frequently paid money out of his own 
pocket for materials and supplies (Tr. 17, 29-30). 
During the period of the defendant's stewardship 
the defendant worked continually under the direct 
supervision and control of the plaintiff. The defendant 
exercised virtually no discretion in managing the cattle 
or in any of the business decisions. Specifically: 
A. The plaintiff exclusively and unilaterally de-
termined the number of cattle to be cared for by 
the defendant (Tr. 21-22). 
B. The defendant had no authority to negotiate the 
sale of, or sell the cattle (Tr. 35). 
C. The defendant moved the cows at the direction 
of and to suit personal pleasure and circum-
stances of the plaintiff (Tr. 50). 
D. The defendant moved the cattle a second time 
to suit the personal pleasure of the plaintiff 
(Tr. 51). 
E. The defendant moved the cattle a third time to 
suit the personal pleasure of the plaintiff (Tr. 
51). 
F . The plaintiff mixed animals at his personal 
pleasure (Tr. 52). 
G. The plaintiff used his personal brand on the 
cattle (Tr. 31). 
H . Accountings were held at the plaintiff's pleas-
ure (Tr. 54, 17). 
5 
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I. The length of the agreement was to be at the 
plaintiff's pleasure (Tr. 55). 
J . Although the defendant kept the cows in his 
possession at times, the plaintiff exercised ulti-
mate control (Tr. 56-57). 
K. The defendant was expected from time to time 
to take care of the plaintiff's personal animals 
(Tr. 51, 62-64). 
For reasons not clear in the record, the relationship 
between the plaintiff and the defendant steadily de-
teriorated until the spring of 1973 at which time the 
parties openly discussed some final settlement of their 
obligations (Tr. 55-56, 29). Since the parties could not 
amicably agree on a settlement, the plaintiff filed an 
Undertaking in Replevin and the sheriff of Wasatch 
County took the cattle from the defendant by Writ of 
Replevin on June 19, 1973. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I. 
AS A M A T T E R O F L A W A COMMUNITY OF 
I N T E R E S T OR J O I N T R I G H T O F CONTROL 
IS N E C E S S A R Y TO CONSTITUTE A J O I N T 
V E N T U R E . 
The cases all uniformly support the proposition 
that a necessary element of a joint venture or partner-
6 
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ship is a community interest or joint right of control. 
The leading Utah case on this point is J chanson 
Brothers Builders, et. al., vs. Board of Review, Indus-
trial Commission, et al, 118 Utah 384, 222 P.2d 563 
(1950). In Johanson the Court quotes Black's Law 
Dictionary and defines the test for a joint venture (at 
393) as follows: uMethod of operation where there is a 
community of interest in the objects and purposes of 
the undertaking and an equal right to direct and govern 
the conduct of each other with respect thereto, and each 
enterpriser must have a right to be heard." 
P O I N T I I . 
AS A M A T T E R OF L A W A M E R E S H A R I N G 
OF P R O F I T S IS NOT A S U F F I C I E N T COM-
M U N I T Y OF I N T E R E S T OR J O I N T R I G H T 
OF CONTROL TO C O N S T I T U T E A J O I N T 
V E N T U R E . 
This proposition becomes important because there 
is testimony that the plaintiff and the defendant did 
agree to "split" the profits. The plaintiff urged in the 
lower court that this sharing of profits was a sufficient 
community of interest to characterize the arrangement 
as a joint venture. 
The leading Utah case on this issue is again Johan-
son, supra, In Johanson an ingenious building con-
tractor determined that he could avoid such trivia as un-
7 
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employment contributions simply by declaring that his 
employees were not really employees after all but joint 
venturers, each earning not wages but a share of the 
profits. Even though the parties may have had an agree-
ment to share profits the Court stated: "Tested by that 
definition [Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition] there 
can be no question but that this was not a joint enter-
prise . . . the facts of this case show that most of the 
workers did not have any voice in the control of man-
agement of the venture; they merely performed their 
work as directed." (Johamon at 393) 
In the more recent Utah Supreme Court case of 
Fern Shutte § Sons vs. Broadbent, 24 Utah 2d 415, 473 
P.2d 885 (1940), the Court (at 418) citing Realty Be-
velopment Company vs. Feit, 154 Colo. 44, 387 P.2d 
898, 899 (1963), states, ". . . three requirements were 
essential for a joint adventure and that none alone was 
sufficient: (1) there must be a joint interest in the 
property by the parties sought to be held as partners; 
(2) there must be agreements, express or implied, to 
share in the profits or losses of the venture; and (3) 
there must be actions or conduct showing cooperation 
in the project . . . " [emphasis added]. 
The Court in Shutte, supra further cites (at 417) 
with approval the well reasoned case of Hayes vs. Kit-
linger, 235 Or. 465, 385 P.2d 747 (1963), which states 
(at 753) "Joint control as well as an agreement to share 
the profits and losses is generally essential to a joint ad-
venture or partnership." 
8 
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P O I N T I I I . 
NO E V I D E N C E W A S I N T R O D U C E D FROM 
W H I C H T H E FACT F I N D E R COULD CON-
C L U D E T H A T A COMMUNITY OF I N T E R -
E S T OR J O I N T R I G H T OF CONTROL E X I S T -
E D B E T W E E N T H E P L A I N T I F F A N D T H E 
D E F E N D A N T . 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the 
elements of the alleged partnership or joint venture, 
Peterson vs. Massey, 53 N W 2d 912 (1952) at 916. The 
plaintiff may of course prove those elements by refer-
ence to the agreement of the parties, or by reference to 
the objective conduct of the parties. Hayes vs. Kil-
linger, supra (at 750). 
Here there was clearly no express agreement which 
gave the defendant any community of interest or joint 
right of control in the business enterprise. The uncon-
tradicted testimony of both parties is that their "agree-
ment" was limited to three elements: The plaintiff was 
to put up the money, the defendant was to do the labor, 
and the profits were to be split. (Tr. 15, 28, 50). None 
of these three elements conveys or implies any com-
munity of interest or joint right of control. 
Looking then beyond the "agreement" of the par-
ties to their objective conduct, it becomes clear that the 
plaintiff treated the defendant merely as a hired hand. 
As described more fully in the Statement of Facts, the 
defendant had absolutely no say in the management or 
9 
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control of the business enterprise. The defendant mere-
ly did as he was told. 
Indeed, from an objective point of view the dignity 
of the defendant's role in the enterprise was perhaps 
best summed up by the plaintiff himself, ". . . we should 
have probably written something down, but we didn't 
any more than I do with people who irrigate for me." 
(Tr. 19). 
Finally and conclusively it is clear from the plain-
tiff's own conduct that a community of interest and joint 
right of control did not exist between the plaintiff and 
defendant. The plaintiff after all replevied the cattle 
from the defendant. In the affidavit for Writ of Re-
plevin the plaintiff states, ". . . plaintiff has good reason 
to believe and does believe that Walter Baker has said 
calves in his possession and under his control, which 
property belongs to the plaintiff." 
The plaintiff has thus made a judicial admission 
under oath that the cattle and the business enterprise 
were his and his alone. Moreover, the plaintiff has al-
ready had his remedy at law by his Writ of Replevin. 
The plaintiff cannot now, in the face of that prior 
admission and remedy, take the new and inconsistent 
position that the defendant did after all have some com-
munity of interest and joint right of control in the ani-
mals and in the business enterprise. 
10 
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CONCLUSION 
The defendant strenuously contends that the lower 
court erred in inferring that a community of interest or 
joint right of control existed between the plaintiff and 
the defendant. Further the lower court erred in con-
cluding that a joint venture existed between the plain-
tiff and the defendant. 
A necessary element of any joint venture is a com-
munity of interest or joint right of control. As this brief 
conclusively demonstrates, no such community of inter-
est or joint right of control existed between the parties. 
I t is therefore respectfully submitted that the lower 
court erred in its holding and this Court should there-
fore order the lower court to amend its findings accord-
ingly. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert J . DeBry 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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